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Abstract 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the efficacy of sporting boycotts as a foreign-
policy tool. Government officials use sporting boycotts, a nontraditional form of a sanction, in 
contemporary politics. Using the Carter administration’s boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics 
as a case study, this thesis elucidates why President Carter chose to implement a sporting 
boycott, and whether the boycott was effective in achieving its intended goals. President Carter 
chose to boycott the Olympics because of the failure of past sanctions to force the Soviet Union 
from Afghanistan, the influence of his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the 
potential to challenge the Soviet Union’s reputation in a very public setting. The boycott did not 
force Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; however, it was an effective symbolic tool aimed to 
embarrass the Soviet Union. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter 
announced that the United States would boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. President 
Carter’s use of an Olympic boycott to exercise foreign policy. This occurrence showcases an 
intersection between sports and foreign policy that elicits several questions about the Carter 
administration’s decision-making process and what factors shaped their decisions. What was the 
Carter administration’s chief objective? Who participated in the decision-making process? What 
options were available to the Carter administration? Why impose a boycott over other options? 
In turn, this knowledge will provide further leverage on the larger topic of sanctions in foreign-
policy.  
In the United States and many other countries, sports and politics are intertwined. 
Athletes and government officials in domestic and international settings often make political 
overtures and carry out demonstrations. The president routinely invites various championship 
teams, both collegiate and professional, to the White House. Athletes often use sporting events as 
a platform to protest. For example, Colin Kaepernick knelt during the national anthem 
proceeding the National Football League’s games to raise awareness of police brutality.1 In the 
international sports arena, the connection between politics and sports is even more apparent. For 
example, some journalists claim the joint participation of North and South Korea in the 2018 
Pyeongchang Winter Olympics as a signal of future peace.2  Russia gained notoriety at this  same 
                                                 
1 Steve Wyche, “Colin Kaepernick Explains Why He Sat During National Anthem,” NFL, published August 28, 
2016, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000691077/article/colin-kaepernick-explains-why-he-sat-during-
national-anthem.  
2 Motoko Rich, “Olympics Open With Koreas Marching Together, Offering Hope for Peace,” The New York Times, 
published February 9th, 2018, from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/world/asia/olympics-opening-ceremony-
north-korea.html.  
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Olympics because some of its athletes were accused of using prohibited drugs, and the Russian 
government allegedly played a role in this scandal.3 Likewise, in the 1980s during the Apartheid 
era, multiple nations participated in a sporting boycott against South Africa.4 In the 1970s the  
Chinese government used “ping-pong diplomacy” to signal its global opening economically and 
diplomatically.5 Although sports are nominally apolitical, sports and politics are often connected. 
 The Olympic Games provide a prime example of a forum where international sports and 
politics are intertwined. Although the Olympics are supposed to be apolitical, some of the most 
notable political protests and demonstrations in history have occurred during the Olympics. For 
example, when African American Jesse Owens defeated Nazi Germany’s runner during the 1936 
Berlin Olympics, commentators touted the win as a victory over Germany’s Aryan beliefs.6 
During the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, American medalists Tommie Smith and John Carlos 
raised their fists on the Olympic podium to express their discontent with race relations in the 
United States.7 Olympic hosts often use the Games as a podium for spreading propaganda and 
demonstrating national pride.  Millions of citizens across the globe watch the Olympic Games.  
Consequently, a myriad of international dignitaries regularly attend the Olympics and often make 
speeches. Furthermore, since the Olympic Charter only recognizes one delegation per nation, the 
Olympic Games are often riddled with international conflict. Indeed, the Olympics are among 
the world’s most politically bound forums for international sports.  
                                                 
3 Tariq Panja, “Dozens of Russian Athletes Lose Appeal, Keeping them Out of the Pyeonchang Olympics,” The New 
York Times, published February 8, 2018, accessed from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/sports/olympics/cas-
russia-doping.html.  
4 Marlene Goldsmith, "Sporting Boycotts as a Political Tool", The Australian Quarterly 67, no. 1 (1995): 11-20, 
doi:10.2307/20635801, 18. 
5 Trevor Taylor, "Sport and World Politics: Functionalism and the State System," International Journal 43, no. 4 
(1988): 531. doi:10.2307/40202562, 550. 
6 Marlene Goldsmith, "Sporting Boycotts as a Political Tool", 18. 
7 Douglas Hartmann, "The Politics of Race and Sport: Resistance and Domination in the 1968 African American 
Olympic Protest Movement," Ethnic and Racial Studies 19, no. 3 (2010): 548-66, 
doi:10.1080/01419870.1996.9993924.  
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 Boycotts would appear to be a form of sanctions, and governments often utilize sanctions 
as a tool of foreign-policy. Governments use sanctions to signal displeasures or to change the 
behavior of the recipient state.  Stuart Murray has framed the use of sports as a foreign-policy 
tool in another way.  Murray’s “sports diplomacy”8 is less about punishing or embarrassing a 
country, as would sanctions or a boycott, and more about using sporting events as a way of 
making amends.  From this perspective, initiating a boycott against a foreign adversary, as was 
the case with the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics, would not constitute sports diplomacy.  
In this work I define the term “sports diplomacy” more broadly than does Murray. In this study, 
by sports diplomacy I mean the political use of sporting events and competitions by governments 
to influence and/or pressure the behavior of, or to embarrass and humiliate, other states.  Such 
political use might include a boycott, sanctions, diplomacy, or a public accusation of corruption 
or cheating. 
Scholarship on the 1980 Moscow Olympics boycott has generally not addressed the 
decision-making process that led to the boycott. Instead, it has primarily examined the event 
from an historical perspective. President Carter’s decision to boycott the 1980 Olympics is 
important and warrants attention because governments continue to use sporting boycotts as a 
foreign-policy tool. Using President Carter’s decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics in 
reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a case study, this thesis will explain the 
decision-making process that led to the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Primary 
sources, including past interviews, speeches, memoirs, and official memoranda, this thesis will 
place the Carter administration’s decision to boycott the Moscow Olympics within the 
framework of international sanctions. The Carter administration was aware that the boycott 
                                                 
8 Stuart Murray, "The Two Halves of Sports-Diplomacy," Diplomacy & Statecraft 23, no. 3 (2012): 576-92, 
doi:10.1080/09592296.2012.706544.  
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would not force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. Instead, President Carter used the 
Olympics boycott as a symbolic measure to embarrass publicly the Soviet Union. Carter, his 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made the 
decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics in the context of their knowledge and 
perceptions about Soviet behavior and the potentially powerful impact of such a decision on the 
Soviet Union’s standing at the Olympics and in the world. The Carter administration chose to 
adopt this approach despite its view that it would unlikely bring about a Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. Although these American foreign-policy makers understood that other sanctions 
had repeatedly failed, they believed that it would send a strong message that the Carter 
administration was ready to get tough with the Soviet Union.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sanctions and International Relations 
 Sporting boycotts in international relations fall within the framework of sanctions. 
Sanctions are an instrument of statecraft, part of a larger set of foreign-policy tools. Margan, 
Babat, and Krustev define sanctions as “actions that one or more countries take to limit or end 
their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change one 
or more of its policies.”9 Similarly, Lutfullah Mangi defines a sanction as: “an action initiated by 
one or more international actors against one or more others with either or both of two purposes: 
to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply 
with certain norms the senders deem important.”10 A state-sponsored sanction could include  
severing diplomatic relations, boycotting cultural or sports events, imposing commercial 
                                                 
9 T. Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat, and Valentin Krustev, "The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-
-2000*," Conflict Management and Peace Science 26, no. 1 (2009): 94. 
10 Lutfullah Mangi, "Sanctions: An Instrument of US Foreign-policy," Pakistan Horizon 51, no. 1 (1998): 29-35, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394643, 30. 
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sanctions on imports and exports, or establishing a naval blockade.11 Usually, sanctions have a 
strong economic component. Since sporting boycotts are used to deprive the target state of some 
value – however broadly construed -- and to pressure the state to comply with certain norms, 
sporting boycotts fall within the framework of sanctions. 
The United States has often utilized sanctions as a foreign-policy tool. Since World War 
II, the United States has implemented more sanctions than any other country.12 Several reasons 
help to explain why the U.S. has imposed sanctions so frequently, particularly after World War 
II. In the decade following the Second World War, the international community took steps to 
bind states together in an international organization that promoted peaceful negotiation, 
collective security, and in an effort on the part of powerful states to create a balance of power to 
prevent war and to encourage the superpowers to spend less on its arms race.13 Sanctions offered 
states a mechanism for pressuring other states while avoiding a military confrontation, thus 
decreasing the likelihood of war. This post-war era thus introduced the routine use of sanctions, 
including sports boycotts, as a foreign-policy tool. For the Carter administration, confronting the 
Soviet Union with military force in the case of Afghanistan would have been costly and futile. 
Thus, the administration utilized sanctions. 
 Many scholars have debated the efficacy of sanctions in international relations, and 
overwhelmingly scholars argue that sanctions often fail to achieve their intended goals. Robert 
Pape argues, for example, that despite their increased use in international relations, economic 
sanctions routinely fall well short of their goals.14  For a sanction to be successful, the target state 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 30. 
12 Ibid., 30. 
13 Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 90. 
doi:10.1162/isec.22.2.90. 
14 Ibid., 93. 
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must concede to a significant portion of the coercer’s demands. Pape’s analysis concludes that 
sanctions succeed in attaining their goals in only about four percent of cases studied.15 
Furthermore, Pape’s analysis found no correlation between the harshness of the punishment and 
the target’s concessions.16 A large group of international relations scholars confirms Pape’s 
argument that sanctions usually do not work. 
Sanctions fall far short for a variety of reasons. First, since states often resort to sanctions 
after other policies have failed, it is highly unlikely that sanctions will coerce the offending state 
into changing its behavior.17 In this case, the target state is committed to its course of behavior. 
Modern states appear to be willing to endure the high costs of sanctions in the pursuit of their 
interests.18  
Another reason that sanctions often fall short is because they tend to rally nationalism in 
the target state. The surge of popular support by citizens who increasingly believe that their state 
is being bullied by another more powerful state leads to a resurgence of confidence and 
obstinacy on the part of the offending regime.19 Consequently, the targeted state becomes more – 
not less – troublesome. Third, sanctions often harm the people in the targeted state and have no 
impact on the ruling elite. Political elites can generally find alternative markets to supply their 
needs. Citizens, however, are forced to conserve or cut consumption. This sometimes leads to a 
significant level of suffering on the part of the people. 
Fourth, sanctions are often costly to the state imposing them. For example, President 
Carter’s 1979 decision to cut wheat imports to the Soviet Union in protest of the invasion of 
                                                 
15 David A Baldwin and Robert A. Pape, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," International Security 23, no. 2 (1998): 
194. doi:10.1162/isec.23.2.189. 
16 Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” 108. 
17 Lutfullah Mangi, "Sanctions: An Instrument of US Foreign-policy," 649. 
18 David A Baldwin and Robert A. Pape, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," 193. 
19 Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, and Detlef Sprinz, "When Do (imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?" World 
Politics 57(4) July 2005: 481. 
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Afghanistan proved to be costlier for the American wheat producer than the Soviet consumer.  
The Soviet Union simply went elsewhere to procure wheat.20 Foreign-policy decision makers 
must weigh the costs associated with sanctions against projected benefits when deciding to 
impose a sanction. President Carter’s 1980 Olympics boycott failed to modify Soviet behavior, 
but it did inflict some harm on the Soviet Union and cost the U.S. very little.  
While their overall success rate is limited, sanctions sometimes succeed. Scholars 
generally measure success by the extent to which the sanctions induced the target nation to 
comply with the wishes of the punishing country.21 Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz have argued that a 
target country will yield to a coercer’s demands if it initially underestimates the impact of the 
sanctions, miscalculates the sender’s determination to impose the sanctions, or wrongly believes 
that the sanctions would be imposed whether it concedes or not.22 Sanctions may also work when 
the target is already experiencing economic difficulties, the sanction is forcefully implemented,  
the sender has few costs associated with the sanction, few countries are needed to implement the 
sanction, and/or the sanction is not imposed in conjunction with covert military action.23 In the 
case of the Olympic boycott, the Carter administration implemented it over a course of seven 
months, in conjunction with covert military action in Afghanistan and declining domestic 
support. 
Although sanctions rarely work, states continue to utilize them as foreign-policy tools 
because they can serve as powerful domestic political tools, and they can be powerful symbols.24 
Sanctions can be used to satisfy a domestic group or demonstrate that the government cares and 
                                                 
20 Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, and Detlef Sprinz, "When Do (imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?" 481. 
21 David A Baldwin and Robert A. Pape, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," 191. 
22 Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, and Detlef Sprinz, "When Do (imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?" 480. 
23 Ibid., 481. 
24 Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, and Detlef Sprinz, "When Do (imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?" 482. 
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is acting. The symbolic value of a sanction can operate at both the domestic and international 
level. By imposing a sanction, a policymaker may garner domestic support while simultaneously 
signaling discontent with the target.25 With President Carter, the American public broadly 
supported his policy as addressing Soviet aggression, while sending a message of discontent to 
the Soviet Union.  
 Looking specifically at sporting boycotts, scholars also question their efficacy as a tool of 
foreign-policy. For example, Dain and Calder argue that sporting boycotts are not effective in 
encouraging a government to change its actions.26 Strengthening links between countries rather 
than severing ties is a more constructive approach to highlighting and eradicating problems, they 
argue. Marlene Goldsmith identifies two examples that support this argument. First, participating 
in the 1936 Berlin Olympics, Jesse Owens ably defeated his German counterpart. This German 
defeat raised much bigger questions internationally about Adolph Hitler’s questionable belief 
that the Aryan race was supreme.27 Second, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and an 
overwhelming number of countries boycotted sporting competitions with South Africa during the 
apartheid. While the sporting boycott likely had little effect on the Apartheid regime, it did raise 
international awareness of the human-rights abuses in the country.28 Thus, sporting boycotts may 
not achieve their intended goals. They might, however, achieve another lesser, yet important, 
goal.  
Sports and Foreign-policy 
                                                 
25 Taehee Whang, "Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United 
States," International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 3 (2011): 788. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00668.x. 
26 Edmund Dain and Gideon Calder, "Not Cricket? Ethics, Rhetoric and Sporting Boycotts," Journal of Applied 
Philosophy24, no. 1 (2007): 95-109, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24355089, 100. 
27 Marlene Goldsmith, "Sporting Boycotts as a Political Tool,” The Australian Quarterly 67, no. 1 (1995): 11-20, 
doi:10.2307/20635801, 18. 
28 Ibid., 18. 
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Using sports as a foreign-policy tools provides an example of states’ relying on soft 
power to shape the behavior of other states. Stuart Murray found that in the second half of the 
twentieth century countries have established strong relationships among politics, diplomacy, and 
sport.29 The main thrust of Murray’s writing is that sports diplomacy could be used to reduce 
estrangement and conflict, as well as promote greater development and dialogue between two 
countries or among a collection of states. Sports diplomacy can thus encompass negotiations, 
compromise, and peace, despite the competitive nature of sports. Sports diplomacy is “low risk, 
low cost, and high profile.”30 Although Murray highlights the potential for building friendly 
relations through sports diplomacy, the Carter administration showcases how sports diplomacy 
could be used as a punitive tool.  
Sporting boycotts are a tool of foreign-policy, but sporting federations are actors who are 
independent of their respective governments. In Trevor Taylor’s examination of the relationship 
between sports and foreign-policy, he categorizes sports as an international nongovernmental 
organization (INGO) with respect to their federations.31 Within the parameters of an INGO, 
sports incorporate an international dimension, general rules, and a governing body. Sports are 
associated with nationalism because many federations’ rules permit only one federation per 
state.32 
 One of the most significant arguments made by Taylor—that sports and sporting 
federations are actors—helps to provide an often-overlooked component of sports and foreign-
policy. Sports authorities seek the maximum amount of freedom in actions from their 
                                                 
29 Stuart Murray, "The Two Halves of Sports-Diplomacy," 576. 
30 Ibid., 583.  
31 Trevor Taylor, "Sport and World Politics: Functionalism and the State System," International Journal 43, no. 4 
(1988): 531. doi:10.2307/40202562, 534. 
32 Ibid., 537. 
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governments.33 Federations such as the International Olympics Committee (IOC) work to 
minimize that freedom. For example, the IOC prohibits national federations from exercising 
political influence. The nominally apolitical relationship between sports federations and 
governments becomes muddled, however, because many national federations receive 
governmental funding.34 Meanwhile, sporting authorities have their own interest in holding 
competition, and this can conflict with the interests of a state. This tension was very much 
present during President Carter’s boycott effort. 
 Taylor also argues that sports are a positive, active, even enjoyable foreign-policy tool. 
International sports are a source of favorable publicity.35 Through the use of sports, governments 
can send diplomatic signals without being directly involved. Taylor cites China’s use of “ping- 
pong diplomacy” with the United Kingdom and United States as an example of this.36 China sent 
a signal that they were ready to open diplomatically and economically by inviting the United 
States and the United Kingdom for a ping pong competition. This offered a non-confrontational 
approach to initiating diplomatic discussions.  
 Sports as a foreign-policy tool can sometimes become problematic. Dain and Calder have 
identified both the appeals and problems associated with using sporting boycotts as a foreign- 
policy tool. Sporting boycotts are meant to be symbolic and make a strong statement, given that 
sports are universal. The use of sports as a foreign-policy tool often undermines the comradery 
and good relationships that they are supposed to promote. The decision on the part of the 
international cricket teams to boycott matches with Zimbabwe illustrates this problem.37 From 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 540. 
34 Trevor Taylor, "Sport and World Politics: Functionalism and the State System," 540. 
35 Ibid., 551. 
36 Ibid., 550. 
37 Edmund Dain and Gideon Calder, “Not Cricket? Ethics, Rhetoric and Sporting Boycotts,” 101. 
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this perspective, Dain and Calder point to the tension between trying to maintain solid diplomatic 
relations and a normal sporting relationship with a country while simultaneously pressuring it to 
improve its human-rights record or administration of justice.38 Regular sporting relations could 
lead the public to believe that the government retains normalcy, respect, and support.39 Indeed, 
President Carter argued that since the United States strongly condemned the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan; the U.S. simply could not conduct business as usual with the U.S.S.R.  
 Dain and Calder raise other critical issues associated with using sporting boycotts.  If an 
actor imposes a sporting boycott against every state with whom there is conflict, these scholars 
ask, would not international sports become a farce because of too many boycotts?40 Given that 
boycotts are meant to make a statement, this could serve as a deterrent from imposing too many 
boycotts and decreasing their effectiveness.  
President Carter and the 1980 Olympics Boycott 
Although the Olympics are meant to be apolitical, historian Allen Guttman has argued 
that the creation of the Olympics had political motivations.41 According to Guttman, states 
established the Olympics, in part, as a means of reconciliation for feuding countries. To ensure 
reconciliation, the Olympic national federations were to maintain neutral political perspectives.42 
Despite the efforts to eliminate politics from the Olympics, politics have remained a central issue 
in deciding who hosts and who participates in the Games.  
The intersection between politics and sport was especially evident during the Cold War. 
Although the Soviet Union controlled its National Olympic Committee and the U.S. exercises 
                                                 
38 Edmund Dain and Gideon Calder, “Not Cricket? Ethics, Rhetoric and Sporting Boycotts,” 95. 
39 Ibid., 99. 
40 Ibid., 101. 
41 Allen Guttmann, "The Cold War and the Olympics," International Journal 43, no. 4 (1988): 554-68, 
doi:10.2307/40202563, 559. 
42 Ibid., 559. 
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considerably less control over its Olympic Committee, the United States was the first country of 
the two to use the Olympics as a political tool.43 Young and Guttman argue that the Carter 
Administration chose to boycott the 1980 Olympics because it could come up with no other 
viable options. Military confrontation would have been unwise, and the boycott had little 
associated costs economically and politically. The Carter administration clearly understood that 
the boycott would not coerce the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan.44 It would, 
however, send a strong message of protest and raise international awareness of the invasion, 
which was a clear violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. 
The Carter administration’s decision to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow 
is one of the most discussed sporting boycotts; however, there is little writing on the subject from 
an American foreign-policy perspective. Nicolas Sarantakes’ Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, 
the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War provides an extensive historical analysis of the event.  
Sarantakes strongly criticizes the decision to boycott the Olympics.45 This thesis will draw upon 
Sarantake’s work by analyzing the decision-making process within the Carter administration. 
The way Carter’s foreign-policy advisors framed the issue of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan affected the policies that President Carter later implemented. In an examination of 
foreign-policy in the Carter administration, Jean Garrison has argued that actors frame issues in a 
way that supports their policy positions.46 Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance each presented differing 
perspectives on the issue, and each contributed to shaping the administration’s foreign-policy. 
During the early stages of the Carter presidency, the president tried to incorporate both the 
                                                 
43 Christopher Young, "Olympic Boycotts: Always Tricky," Dissent 55, no. 3 (2008): 68 
44 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, New York: 
Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, 430. 
45 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 13. 
46 Jean A. Garrison, "Framing Foreign-policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and 
the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda," Political Psychology 22, no. 4 (2001): 775. 
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recommendations of Brzezinski and Vance in an effort to create consistency and consensus 
within his foreign-policy.47 Garrison argues that individuals, including Vance and Brzezinski, 
who enjoyed greater access to President Carter could influence and control his knowledge of the 
Soviet Union and its invasion into Afghanistan.48 National Security Advisor Brzezinski exercised 
more influence over Carter than did Vance. Brzezinski’s interpretation of the Soviet-Afghan war 
markedly shaped the president’s interpretation of both Soviet policy and the appropriate options 
for U.S. response, including an Olympic boycott.  
Scholars generally agree that sanctions and boycotts fall short in achieving their intended 
goals. This assessment extends to sporting boycotts and the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Utilizing 
the framework provided on sanctions, sports as a foreign-policy tool, the 1980 Moscow 
Olympics boycott, and drawing on the evidence provided by both primary and secondary 
sources, this work offers a case study of the Carter administration’s decision to boycott   
Moscow’s Summer Olympics and the factors that contributed to the decision.  
METHODS 
 For this thesis, I will examine the efficacy of sporting boycotts as a tool of foreign-policy 
and the associated decision-making process. The Carter administration’s decision-making 
process will be assessed through primary sources, dating from November 1979 to May 1980, that 
shed light on the Soviet-Afghan war and the boycott. These primary sources include speeches, 
documents provided by the Carter Presidential Library, written records of interviews with key 
actors, official memoranda and correspondence during the Carter presidency, and declassified 
documents provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In addition, I will examine media 
coverage, and newspapers. The memoirs of President Jimmy Carter, former Secretary of State 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 780. 
48 Ibid., 781. 
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Cyrus Vance, and former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski also offer further 
insight into the decision-making process during this time. The memoirs and historical accounts 
of secondary actors, such as former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, public opinion surveys, 
and accounts by Olympic athletes, and the U.S. Olympic Committee will also be included in this 
analysis.  
 I have tried to rely on primary sources because they provide the best insight on the 
decision-making process during the Carter presidency. Memoirs written by Carter, Vance, and 
Brzezinski offer a lucid recounting of the events during that time. Some of the limitations of 
these sources include the fact that they were written retroactively, and Carter, Vance, and 
Brzezinski mostly recounted from memory and personal notes in their writing. Such writing may 
be subject to some inaccuracies and may not be objective. To mitigate these issues, secondary 
sources are included as a supplement. 
EARLY CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Carter Presidency 
The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Carter 
administration was defined by negotiations on nuclear arms deals—such as the Strategic Arms 
and Limitations Treaty II (SALT II), Cold War politics, and the Carter administration’s foreign- 
policy goals surrounding human rights. SALT II, a potentially significant nuclear-arms treaty 
negotiated between the Soviet Union and the United States, was neither approved by the 
Congress nor signed by President Carter. Carter’s personal principles relating to human rights 
and its influence on his foreign-policy stood out as a source of tension between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.49 The Carter administration held the belief that the Soviet Union was an 
                                                 
49 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, University of Arkansas Pbk, ed, Fayetteville, AR: 
University of Arkansas Press, 1995, 148. 
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aggressor in world affairs, especially in the Middle East and Africa. Although President Carter 
wanted to improve relations with the Soviet Union, the relationship between the two countries 
deteriorated rapidly. 
As the newly elected President of the United States in 1977, President Jimmy Carter wanted 
to set a new precedent for American foreign-policy. He believed that the United States had lost 
its position as the moral authority and primary advocate for democracy after the Vietnam War, 
the Watergate scandal, and President Gerald Ford’s pardons.50 President Carter believed that a 
moral and idealistic approach to foreign-policy was realistic, and that moral principles were the 
best guidelines in shaping the use of American power and influence abroad. Both National 
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance wholly supported 
Carter’s desire to advocate for human rights.51 Indeed, human rights stood out as perhaps the 
single most important focus of the Carter administration’s foreign-policy team.  
President Carter wanted to improve U.S.-Soviet relations while not ignoring Soviet human- 
rights violations. Initially, Carter believed he could both build better relations with Moscow and 
address its human-rights problems.52 These two goals quickly came into conflict with one 
another. President Carter’s support of Soviet dissidents such as Vladimir Slepak and Andrei 
Amalrik effected a source of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States; Soviet 
leaders viewed Washington’s push for democratization and human rights as an excuse for 
meddling in Soviet internal affairs.53 As time progressed Carter became markedly less optimistic 
regarding his ability to work closely with the Soviet Union. He became more suspicious of 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 147. 
51 Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation, 107. 
52 Jean Garrison, “Framing Foreign-policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the 
Struggle for Arms Control Agenda,” 781. 
53 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War, 55. 
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Soviet motives, particularly regarding Moscow’s military ventures in the Middle East and 
Africa.54 Instead of cooperating, Carter began to view the Soviet Union pessimistically and 
assessed their motives in terms of competition.  
President Carter was critical of past administrations’ initiatives with the Soviet Union. 
President Richard Nixon initiated détente, which was meant to ease tension between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, prevent a nuclear war, and progress toward normalizing relations 
between the two nations. Carter believed that the détente initiatives, including SALT I, had 
favored the Soviet Union.55 Nuclear arms-control was important to President Carter because he 
viewed it as a first step toward better relations with the Soviet Union.56 He expressed such 
sentiments in his memoir: “My intention was to cooperate with the Soviets whenever possible, 
and I saw a successful effort in controlling nuclear weapons as the best tool for improving our 
relations.”57 Carter aggressively promoted SALT II because he believed that it would provide a 
basis for a reciprocal relationship between the two countries. The Carter administration sought to 
cap the number of nuclear arms on the part of both countries. But this goal conflicted with his 
negative perception of the Soviets as an aggressor.58 The administration and Congress struggled 
to separate the issue of Soviet military adventurism from the SALT II negotiations.59 Although 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. negotiated the treaty successfully, Congress did not support it, and 
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ultimately the president did not ratify it primarily because of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.60  
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
Part of the reason the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan because it viewed the country’s 
ruling communist party as untrustworthy and incapable of maintaining control.61 Afghans 
rebelled against the Khalq Communist Party, Afghanistan’s ruling party, which was led by Noor 
Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin.62 Before the Soviet-Afghan War, the Khalq 
Communist Party overthrew the existing Afghan government, installing Nur Mohammad Taraki 
as president.63 The modernizing reforms instituted by the Taraki government were unpopular, 
and the regime repressed political opponents. After the assassination of Taraki, his rival, 
Hafizullah Amin, seized control of the Afghan government and ruling party. Amin instituted 
policies in disregard of Soviet counsel. Although Amin’s policies were socialist, they were 
brutally implemented in an underdeveloped Muslim country.64 These new socialist policies 
coupled with Amin’s repressive regime spawned widespread rebellion, which the Amin 
government could not control despite Soviet military aid.65 Because of Amin’s disregard for 
Soviet preferences and the growing insurgency, the Soviet Union viewed the Afghan regime as 
unruly, unpredictable, and  threatening.66 The Soviets also worried that in desperation Amin 
would turn to the West or China for help. Thus, the Soviet Union exploited factions within the 
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Khalq Communist Party, and supported Amin’s political opponents, which culminated in the 
1979 invasion. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had both offensive and defensive elements. The Soviet 
Union wanted to restore order in its neighboring country; it was genuinely concerned about the 
political instability on its border.67 Soviet leaders also believed that inaction would have a 
spillover effect in other Muslim countries and Eastern Europe against socialist governments. 
During that time, the Soviet Union was geopolitically surrounded by adversaries such as India 
and China. 
*Map of the Soviet Union in the 1980s.68  
Following the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union wanted to defend the ideal of socialism 
internationally.69 In Soviet propaganda related to the invasion, the Soviet press claimed that the 
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invasion was in response to threats from the West. The United States had increased its military 
budget and military actions in Iran during the hostage crisis. The Soviet Union wanted to be in a 
better position to exploit chaos in Iran and feared that the United States was attempting to drive 
Afghanistan into its strategic arc.70 Although the Soviet Union was genuinely concerned about its 
border, it also considered Afghanistan’s strategic position.  
Soviet leadership believed that the U.S. would not respond to the invasion because of other 
world events. On December 25, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Soviets chose 
this date because they knew that American officials would not be available because of the 
Christmas holiday.71 Furthermore, the Soviet leadership believed that the United States would be 
too preoccupied with the Iran hostage crisis to respond quickly and effectively to the Afghanistan 
issue. The distraction of the Iran hostage crisis became more apparent during the boycotting 
effort after the failed U.S. led rescue mission in Tehran in late April 1980. After initial success in 
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union struggled to restore order, and the effort became a failure.72 The 
Soviet Union resorted to greater force in the country and ultimately remained in Afghanistan 
until 1989.  
U.S. Reactions to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
From the perspective of the Carter administration, the Soviet Union was meddling in 
Afghanistan’s political affairs. Publicly, Soviet leadership claimed that it invaded Afghanistan 
for defensive purposes and that Afghan officials requested its help.73 Carter rebuffed the Soviet 
claim that only military advisors had entered Afghanistan in an attempt to strengthen opposition 
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forces in Kabul.74 The Carter administration argued that the Afghan government prior to the 
invasion had wanted to maintain its independence, and that the Soviets had installed a new 
Afghan president who served as their puppet.75 Carter saw Soviet involvement in Afghanistan as 
a prelude for further activity in the region. During President Carter’s “Address to the Nation on 
the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” on January 4, 1980, he stated: 
This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further 
Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia and also because such an 
aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world… We must 
recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan to stability and peace. A Soviet-
occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a steppingstone to possible 
control over much of the world's oil supplies… In the meantime, neither the United States 
nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do 
business as usual with the Soviet Union. Although the United States would prefer not to 
withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union 
must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of 
athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the 
Olympic games.76 
 
Carter believed that Soviet control of Afghanistan could allow the U.S.S.R. access to Iran and 
thus disrupt the export of oil from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. Communist Party General 
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev promised Carter that he would withdraw troops once his military had 
achieved its objective. But no withdrawal took place. In fact, at one point the Soviet had more 
than 100,000 troops were deployed in Afghanistan.77 This increasingly tense situation became a 
high-priority crisis for the Carter administration. 
In reaction to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration took 
multiple actions. Prior to the Soviet invasion, opposition groups within the U.S. had criticized the 
president for not countering Soviet gains. In response to this criticism he adopted a tough stance 
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on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.78 Although Carter had pronounced the Carter Doctrine, he 
was not ready to engage militarily with the Soviet Union. Thus, President Carter sought other 
means to hinder Soviet progress in Afghanistan. For example, he implemented an economic 
embargo, halted grain and technology sales, and revoked Soviet fishing rights in American 
territorial waters.79 The U.S. government canceled all diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets. 
Moreover, the U.S. took the lead at the United Nations (U.N.) in convincing 140 countries, 
including some Soviet allies, to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.80 In addition, 
members of the Carter administration met with members of the Afghan insurgency. The U.S. 
then provided covert military aid to the group.81 Finally, President Carter announced that the 
United States would boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics. 
The Olympic Boycott 
On January 20, 1980, during a Meet the Press interview, President Jimmy Carter 
announced that the United States would not send athletes to the 1980 Summer Olympics in 
Moscow if the Soviet Union did not remove its troops from Afghanistan within a month.82 In his 
Meet the Press interview with Bill Monroe, President Carter stated: 
Neither I nor the American people would support the sending of an American team to 
Moscow with Soviet invasion troops in Afghanistan. I've sent a message today to the 
United States Olympic Committee spelling out my own position: that unless the Soviets 
withdraw their troops within a month from Afghanistan, that the Olympic games be 
moved from Moscow to an alternate site or multiple sites or postponed or canceled. If the 
Soviets do not withdraw their troops immediately from Afghanistan within a month, I 
would not support the sending of an American team to the Olympics. It's very important 
for the world to realize how serious a threat the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan is.83 
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A month passed, and Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. Thus, the United States did not 
send a delegation to the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.   
Two other international events are important in relation to the United States’ decision to 
boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. The first event was the 1979 fall of the Shah of 
Iran and the subsequent Iran hostage crisis. On November 4, 1979, students in Iran stormed the 
United States embassy in Tehran, taking 60 Americans hostage after the United States admitted 
the Shah into the United States for medical treatment.84 The Iran hostage crisis wholly occupied 
the attention of the Carter administration’s foreign-policy team and influenced its decisions for 
the remainder of the Carter presidency. The second event of importance was the 1980 Winter 
Olympics in Lake Placid, New York.85 At this time, it was still uncertain whether the Carter 
administration would follow through with the boycott, and the Soviet Union participated in the 
Lake Placid Games. The United States’ hockey team was not expected to earn a medal during the 
Games but went on to defeat the Soviet Union’s elite and nearly undefeated hockey team.86 The 
game was touted as a match between democracy and communism. The win instilled national 
pride in the American public, and Carter said he hoped the gold medal was an omen for better 
times.87 What became known as the “Miracle on Ice,” went on to undermine public support for 
the Carter administration’s effort to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.  
KEY ACTORS 
 Any assessment of the Carter administration’s decision to boycott the 1980 Summer 
Olympics in Moscow requires an analysis of the critical actors who influenced the decision to 
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implement a sporting boycott. The Carter administration wanted to embarrass and punish the 
Soviet Union. Several factors contributed to the implementation of the sporting boycott as a 
foreign-policy tool. Each key actor’s background, beliefs, and perceptions of the Soviet Union 
led to his recommendation of or acquiesce to the boycott. The primary actors identified in 
relation to the decision to boycott the Olympics are President Jimmy Carter, National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. These three actors were the 
primary decision makers in American foreign-policy from 1977 to 1981. 
President Jimmy Carter 
 Carter’s personal approach to foreign-policy influenced his decision to boycott the 
Moscow Olympics. President Carter perceived a “malaise” among citizens that reflected 
widespread disillusionment primarily because of the violent anti-war movement, the defeat in 
Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal. Carter, a deeply religious Christian, sought to restore the 
public’s belief and commitment to moral values and justice. As an extension of this, Carter 
wanted the United States to claim the moral high ground in world affairs and advocated for 
human rights in his practice of foreign-policy. Such sentiments are expressed in Carter’s writing: 
“Our country has been strongest and most effective when morality and a commitment to freedom 
and democracy have been most clearly emphasized in our foreign-policy.”88  
Carter understood that his commitment to human rights was viewed as naïve and 
idealistic. He argued nonetheless that American idealism was practical and realistic in foreign 
affairs because moral principles, in his view, offered the best way to exert American power and 
influence. President Carter also embraced “public diplomacy,” which relied heavily on widely 
available information and open international exchanges. Carter preferred economic and 
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diplomatic action over military action, and this is evinced in his response to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. Although the U.S. government did not frame the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
as a human-rights issue, the Carter administration frequently used language couched in moral 
principles as justification for the Olympic boycott.    
The organization and protocols of Carter’s cabinet influenced how the decision was 
crafted regarding the Olympics boycott. Carter had organized his policy-advisory system to 
promote open dialogue, an environment in which advisors would listen and participate in a 
healthy debate.89 During meetings, Carter would remain at the center of the discussions, 
receiving advice and information from his many advisors.90 In this setting, Carter was able to 
hear the arguments of both Brzezinski and Vance regarding the Soviet Union. Although this type 
of organization of Carter’s advisory system was supposed to promote teamwork among his 
foreign-policy advisors, it created tension and debates riddled with infighting.91 Given the 
tension, Carter grew increasingly dependent on Brzezinski and Vance, who themselves competed 
with one another to see who could exercise the most influence over the president. 
 In general, Brzezinski mistrusted the Soviet leaders and emphasized competition when 
assessing their motives.92 Vance was more willing to trust Soviet intentions and wanted Carter to 
move beyond East-West competition. Often Brzezinski was better positioned to gain access to 
and influence over President Carter. Brzezinski chaired the Special Coordination Committee 
(SCC), which handled crises such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.93 Brzezinski also had a 
direct line to President Carter and met with him daily for security briefings. Secretary of State 
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Cyrus Vance resented Brzezinski’s influence on President Carter. This resentment ultimately 
contributed to Vance’s resignation.94 Observers of the Carter presidency assert that the president 
was an eager student of Brzezinski, and that Carter’s relationship with Vance was more distant 
and formal.95 President Carter was admittedly closer to Brzezinski and the Nation Security 
Council (NSC) staff.96 Thus, Brzezinski enjoyed more influence than Vance over Carter’s 
decision-making process.  
President Carter’s perception of the Soviet Union evolved throughout his presidency. 
During the early stages of his presidency, Carter was optimistic about the Soviet Union’s 
motives.97 He hoped to build a better relationship with the Soviet Union and to work towards 
nuclear arms reduction. Carter’s optimistic view of the Soviet Union aligned with that of Cyrus 
Vance. As time progressed, however, Carter grew disillusioned and moved to adopt a more 
negative view of Soviet motives.98 Carter’s negative perception of the Soviet Union grew out of 
Moscow’s response to his human-rights advocacy, the influence of Zbigniew Brzezinski, and 
Soviet military aggression. Given Brzezinski’s access to the president and his negative 
perception of Soviet motives, he skillfully shaped Carter’s growing perception that the Soviets 
were to be perceived as an adversary. Soviet behavior, particularly its military activities, 
strengthened the negative perceptions of both Carter and Brzezinski. Thus, over time Carter 
adopted a more confrontational approach toward the Soviet Union. 
In the case of Afghanistan, Carter believed that the Soviet Union was an aggressor 
against a deeply religious and independent country. Carter expressed this in his memoir: “The 
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invasion of Afghanistan was direct aggression by the Soviet armed forces against a freedom-
loving people, whose leaders had been struggling to retain a modicum of independence from 
their huge neighbor.”99 Carter believed that the Soviet Union wanted to overthrow the existing 
Afghan government to expand Moscow’s sphere of influence.100 To Carter, Afghanistan had 
been violently reduced to a Soviet puppet state, which had further implications in the Persian 
Gulf region.101 If the Soviets consolidated power in Afghanistan, then the balance of power 
would be in Moscow’s favor in the region. At the time of the invasion, Carter wrote in his diary: 
“This is the most serious international development that has occurred since I have been 
President, and unless the Soviets recognize that it has been counterproductive for them we will 
face additional serious problems with invasions or subversions in the future.”102 During Carter’s 
1980 State of the Union Address, he introduced  the Carter Doctrine, which asserted that any 
threat by a country against the Persian Gulf would be viewed as a threat against the U.S., and the 
U.S. would respond to the threat by any means necessary.103 The Carter Doctrine directly 
targeted the Soviet Union; indeed, it was a clear response to Soviet aggression. 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 
 Although National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski possessed a nuanced 
knowledge of the Soviet Union as an historian, President Carter initially lacked extensive 
knowledge of foreign-policy. Consequently, he relied heavily on Brzezinski to educate and 
instruct him on U.S.-Soviet relations.104 In his memoir, Carter described Brzezinski as 
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knowledgeable, providing him with acute analyses of global occurrences.105 Brzezinski’s 
approach to foreign-policy was centered on a strong defense.106 As a part of the National 
Security Council (NSC), Brzezinski developed innovative policies toward the Soviet Union in an 
effort to balance the diplomatic aims of the State Department. However, this political 
strategizing took place within an environment of mistrust. Brzezinski remained highly suspicious 
of Soviet claims throughout the Carter presidency.  
Brzezinski’s personal history shaped his views toward the Soviet Union. Born and raised 
in Poland, Brzezinski had studied the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries and 
possessed a profound knowledge of communist governments and ideologies.107 The son of a 
Polish diplomat, Brzezinski spent time in Warsaw, Canada, and finally the U.S., where he 
attended graduate school at Harvard University. Brzezinski’s Polish origin remained a source of 
controversy among opponents of the Carter administration because they his background made 
him biased against the Soviet Union. Many of Brzezinski’s critics saw him as overly 
aggressive.108 Critics of Brzezinski pointed to the many disagreements between Brzezinski and 
Vance over the direction of policy as evidence of such aggression.109 Brzezinski, more vocal and 
outspoken, continued to wield a more powerful position than Vance.110  In fact, Carter regularly 
asked Brzezinski to speak on his behalf at public events. Brzezinski’s tenure as NSA came to be 
wholly defined by his difficult relationship with Cyrus Vance and his extremely close friendship 
with the president. 
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During the Soviet crisis, Brzezinski met with Carter daily for the Presidential Daily 
Briefing.111 As chairman of the SCC, Brzezinski took the lead on the administration’s response 
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.112 Although Vance also served on this committee, his role 
remained limited. If the SCC agreed to something, chairman Brzezinski personally delivered to 
the president the Presidential Directive for signing.113  
Moreover, Carter trusted Brzezinski and admired his bold and confident style. Brzezinski 
made decisions quickly and implemented them even more quickly.114 The two men also shared a 
close friendship. They jogged together, watched movies, and often dined together.115 Brzezinski 
had a hand in writing most of Carter’s major foreign-policy speeches, generally prepared by the 
NSC speechwriters. In his memoir, Brzezinski explained that he intentionally shaped Carter’s 
views and policies toward the Soviet Union.116 Brzezinski’s access to Carter on foreign-policy 
issues was unmatched by Vance, and he used this access to influence the president on Soviet 
policy. 
 President Carter’s development of a negative perception of the Soviet Union reflected 
Brzezinski’s mistrust of the Soviets. Brzezinski’s primary objective upon entering the White 
House was to improve the United States’ strategic position in relation to the Soviet Union.117 
Zbigniew Brzezinski believed that one of the primary problems that the Carter administration 
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had with the Soviet Union was that it had trouble maintaining its credibility in Moscow.118 
Brzezinski was concerned that the Soviet’s growing military power would exacerbate issues in 
the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Africa. He also worried that the Soviet Union sought to 
displace the U.S. as an international power.119 Consequently, Brzezinski urged Carter to project a 
tougher stance toward Moscow. From this perspective, Brzezinski saw the human-rights 
approach as a counter to Soviet ideology.120 His chief recommendations to the president included 
condemning Soviet intervention in Africa, strengthening NATO defense, increasing defense 
spending, and publicly exposing the Kremlin’s  military buildup.121 Brzezinski encouraged 
Carter to promote the image of America as a “city upon a hill”, thus framing the Soviets as an 
aggressor that the United States must counteract.122  
Regarding Afghanistan, Brzezinski’s interpreted the Soviet invasion as a direct threat to 
the U.S. security. Brzezinski argued that the invasion essentially transformed Afghanistan from a 
buffer between the United States and the Soviet Union to an offensive Soviet instrument to be 
used to strengthen control of the Indian Ocean.123 In a memorandum to President Carter, 
Brzezinski called for a strong and decisive response to the Soviet invasion, which included 
possible military confrontation and the showcasing of public outrage.124 Brzezinski raised the 
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issue repeatedly with President Carter during his briefings; he wanted to implement a sustained 
and costly reaction.  
At the time, public opinion had turned somewhat against Carter. It viewed him 
increasingly as soft and indecisive. Brzezinski encouraged the president to work toward 
strengthening his foreign-policy image by initiating a tougher approach to Moscow’s 
expansionism.125 As part of this approach Brzezinski and the NSC pressed for more stringent 
actions, and the State Department complied reluctantly. Brzezinski recommended a formal 
expression for the record of the U.S. position in the form of a State Department publication of 
Soviet activities in Afghanistan. He also urged Carter to demonstrate publicly sympathy for the 
Afghan insurgents. Carter implemented all these recommendations.126  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was another major actor in the Carter administration’s 
foreign-policy decision-making process. Like Brzezinski, Secretary Vance was present during 
the Carter presidential campaign. In his memoir, Vance notes that he spent a lot of time with 
Carter before his presidency, informing him on foreign affairs, but a close bond did not 
develop.127 When Carter asked Vance about Brzezinski’s serving as National Security Advisor, 
Vance requested two commitments.128 First, Vance wanted Carter to be clear and firm that Vance 
was the sole spokesman for foreign-policy. Second, he wanted to give Carter his 
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recommendations separately from Brzezinski.129 As time progressed, Vance describes a breach 
in this understanding.  
Both Brzezinski and Vance had the opportunity to influence President Carter on foreign-
policy. During a weekly Presidential Breakfast, Vance, Brzezinski and Carter would meet to 
speak frankly about foreign-policy issues.130 Secretary Vance also submitted foreign-policy 
briefings to President Carter. While President Carter respected and listened to Vance, he viewed 
his policies recommendations as too conservative. He much preferred the bold and innovative 
policies of Zbigniew Brzezinski.  
As a lawyer and head of the State Department, Vance’s approach to foreign-policy 
differed from that of Brzezinski. He viewed the international system as pluralistic, whereas 
Brzezinski maintained a bipolar view.131 Vance’s primary objective as Secretary of State was 
diplomacy and building a better relationship with the Soviet Union. Vance preferred to reach an 
agreement with the Soviet Union rather than take a confrontational approach.132 Later in the 
Carter presidency, Vance understood the need for Carter to look tougher on the Soviet Union, 
but he did not want to damage U.S.-Soviet relations.133 Vance advocated for actions that would 
decrease conflict with the Soviet Union. Brzezinski criticized Vance’s approach to the Soviet 
Union, arguing that Vance was too accommodating and eager to reach an agreement.134 Vance’s 
differences with Carter and Brzezinski regarding confrontation versus diplomacy led to his 
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resignation in April 1980. Cyrus Vance's beliefs on how to conduct U.S.-Soviet relations in the 
end differed quite extensively from those of others within the Carter administration.  
In the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Vance agreed that it was an issue, but 
disagreed with Brzezinski and Carter on how the administration should respond. Like Carter and 
Brzezinski, Vance saw the Persian Gulf as a strategically important region to the United States. 
Contrary to Brzezinski and Carter, Vance believed that the reason why the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan was because, as the Soviets argued, the Soviets wanted to secure its border.135 
Where the Soviets miscalculated, according to Vance, was in their expectation that the U.S. and 
the international community would not react in any significant way. Although Vance believed 
that the Soviet-Afghan War was important, he supported a subtler response, one that would not 
complicate U.S.-Soviet relations.136 He also argued that sanctions of any kind would exacerbate 
their already deteriorating relationship. Vance routinely opposed any confrontation with the 
Soviet Union, an approach that the administration ultimately adopted.137  
Vice President Walter Mondale 
 Although Vice President Walter Mondale was not a predominant decision-maker in 
American foreign-policy during the Carter presidency, he did play a small role in the decision to 
boycott the Moscow Olympics. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, cognizant of domestic 
opinion, Mondale began to take notice of calls to boycott the Moscow Olympics. During a SCC 
meeting on the Soviet invasion, Mondale suggested that the United States boycott the Moscow 
Olympics.138 Later, Brzezinski, Mondale, Press Secretary Jody Powell, Warren Christopher, and 
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nominally, Secretary Vance recommended to Carter that the U.S. boycott the Games. Although 
Mondale was not the primary influencer on President Carter on foreign-policy, he was the person 
who proposed the idea of an Olympic boycott. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BOYCOTT 
 
President Jimmy Carter 
President Carter had little prior knowledge of the intricacies of the Olympics and 
international sport federations before he decided to boycott the Moscow Olympics. He initially 
ignored the option of boycotting because the response would be delayed, and the move would 
hurt American athletes.139 However, Carter was swayed to impose the boycott because he 
believed that the United States’ absence from the Olympics would deliver a significant blow to 
Soviet prestige.140 Early on, President Carter wanted to host an alternative competition to the 
Olympics to appease the athletes and retain public support. However, he neither understood the 
symbolism of the Olympic movement nor committed enough resources to the alternate 
competition, which would require housing, sporting facilities, and security.141 The administration 
struggled to obtain support from other countries and athletes for the alternate games; the prestige 
of the Olympics could not be matched by this alternative competition and few countries agreed 
to participate.  
The USOC nominally had the right to determine whether the United States would boycott 
the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. No one within the Carter administration had contacted 
the USOC before announcing the boycott.142 When organizing the boycott, Carter spent much of 
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his time lobbying government officials who had little control over whether their country would 
send a delegation to Moscow.143 Later, however, President Carter, his staff, and Congress spent 
time lobbying the USOC and other countries’ Olympic federations to boycott the Games in 
Moscow. These events showcased the Carter administration’s progression in the boycotting 
effort. 
Over time Carter came to understand the intricacies of the Olympics. For example, Carter 
cited the Olympic principles related to good sportsmanship and fair play as justification for the 
boycott, arguing that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violated these principles.144 In relation 
to the boycotting effort, Carter wrote:  
Throughout the spring, Congress and I had been trying to induce the United States 
Olympic Committee and the committees in as many other nations as possible not to 
attend the Olympic Games scheduled in Moscow… We had to struggle all the way; the 
outcome was always in doubt. Most Olympic committees were wholly independent 
bodies, whose members deeply resented any government involvement in their decisions. 
Nevertheless, in television interviews, speeches, and through direct appeals during 
official meetings, I and many other national leaders pointed out that it would be a 
violation of Olympic principles of good sportsmanship and fair play to be guests of the 
Soviet Union under existing circumstances.145 
 
Despite the boycott being one of many actions that President Carter enacted in response to the 
Soviet invasion, he acknowledged that none of these actions would force the Soviet Union out of 
Afghanistan.146 Instead, Carter wanted to make the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as costly as 
possible. In this, Carter wanted to punish the Soviet Union. By boycotting the Moscow 
Olympics, the United States would send a strong symbolic message to the Soviet Union. 
Carter was criticized for announcing the one-month deadline publicly because it 
committed him to action prematurely. Because of Carter’s early announcement on Meet the 
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Press and the one-month deadline, more actors became involved with the implementation of the 
boycott, and the process lasted longer. After the mid-January one-month deadline passed, the 
administration had to reaffirm the boycott in February. The question of whether the boycott 
would be implemented loomed until May, when the USOC voted to boycott the Olympics in 
Moscow. Finally, some questioned whether President Carter could be swayed on the decision to 
boycott before the commencement of the Games in June. The implementation of the Olympics 
boycott was long and delayed.  
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Brzezinski supported the boycott. He argued that the Soviets would use the Olympics as a 
tool of propaganda, and that the boycott would hurt Soviet prestige.147 The boycott also had 
domestic support, which solidified Brzezinski’s support. In fact, Brzezinski played a central role 
in providing information regarding the boycott to both Carter and the public. For Carter, he 
delivered briefings on the boycott’s progress.148 For the public, he explained the rationale of the 
policy. For example, when addressing American Olympic athletes, he explained how sports is an 
extension of politics, providing the justification for the boycott. Brzezinski remained active and 
aggressive in implementing the boycott in an effort to punish the Soviet Union in an extremely 
public forum.  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance opposed the boycott.  Instead, he wanted to open 
communications with the Soviets. Despite these reservations, he publicly stood behind the 
administration’s decision and helped implement the policy.149 For example, in a Washington Post 
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interview, Vance defended the boycott as necessary and justified, and he rejected the argument 
that the 1936 Berlin Olympics set a historical precedent for participating in the Olympic 
Games.150 Vance argued that Nazi Germany successfully used the Olympics for propaganda, and 
that the Soviet Union would do the same. Moreover, Vance contended that the purpose of the 
boycott was to punish Moscow for the invasion, force Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and 
serve as a deterrence against similar actions in the future.151 Ultimately, Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance was one of the few sources of opposition within the Carter administration, but was 
obligated to show support for the action as a Cabinet member. 
Vice President Walter Mondale 
 After suggesting that the Carter administration boycott the Moscow Olympics, Vice 
President Mondale was involved with implementing the boycott by garnering domestic support. 
He lobbied the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and appealed to it to persuade the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) to relocate or postpone the 1980 Summer Olympics.152 
Furthermore, Mondale served as a spokesman for President Carter, reiterating Carter’s stance 
that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan threatened national security. During his speech before the 
USOC vote on whether to boycott the Olympics, Mondale emphasized the symbolism of the 
Olympics for the Soviet Union: 
When the Communist Party prints a million handbooks to tell its top activists that the 
Summer Games mean world respect for Soviet foreign-policy, surely that issue is behind 
us. Nor, is it a question of drawing a line between sports and politics. That line the 
Soviets long ago erased. When billions of rubles are diverted to the games from Soviet 
domestic needs; when Moscow and other Olympic cities are purged of dissidents who 
might speak out; when Soviet children who might meet Western people and ideas on the 
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streets are packed off to internal exile; when Soviet emissaries roam the globe offering 
athletes expense-paid trips to Moscow; when Soviet sports officials distort the number of 
teams committed to participating—surely the issue of Soviet politics in Soviet sports is 
also behind us.153 
 
Mondale also did not want athletes to feel like political pawns. He thanked them for making a 
sacrifice for the greater good of the country. Drawing upon the sacrifices that American farmers 
made during the grain embargo, Mondale reiterated the appeal to Olympic athletes and all 
Americans to make sacrifices for their country.154 Walter Mondale sought to legitimize the use of 
a sporting boycott as a sanction by gaining domestic support.  
White House Special Counsel Lloyd Cutler 
 Once President Carter made the decision to boycott the Games, he delegated the task of 
organizing the boycott to White House Special Counsel, Lloyd Cutler. Cutler’s sole 
responsibility was to ensure that the boycott succeeded.  Shortly after accepting this position, 
Cutler recommended that Carter used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA) to prohibit television networks such as NBC from making additional payments to the 
Soviet Union to broadcast the Olympics.155 Cutler was active in lobbying corporations to cease 
donations to the USOC and to support the boycotts. To supplement the lost donations going 
toward the USOC, Cutler offered Robert Kane, president of the USOC, $10 million to make up 
for its losses.156 Cutler also organized a meeting between Lord Killanin, the president of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and President Carter. Carter agreed to the meeting 
because he wanted an opportunity to convince Killanin to support the boycott. Killanin refused 
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to support the boycott, and the meeting proved to be unproductive.157 Cutler then muddled the 
boycott’s decision-making process by announcing that if the Soviet Union withdrew from 
Afghanistan after President Carter’s deadline, but before the Moscow Olympics, the 
administration would reconsider the boycott.158 This statement was controversial, and Cutler was 
increasingly viewed as an official who was creating chaos and confusion regarding the boycott. 
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
 The primary goal of the USOC and the IOC was to hold a successful Moscow Olympics 
with all nations present. Predictably, both committees viewed the boycott as a significant blow to 
the Olympics.159 To express such sentiments, on January 7, 1980, the USOC voted to resist 
political intrusions into the Olympics, despite the invasion of Afghanistan.160 Killanin lobbied 
officials within the Carter administration to change their minds regarding this issue. Observers of 
the IOC during this period contended that Killanin was charming but unpersuasive as a 
negotiator. Consequently, some scholars have argued that Killanin’s personal traits undermined 
the IOC’s effort to change U.S. policy.161 Along with Killanin, Robert Kane, the president of the 
USOC, also appealed to Carter to rescind the boycott.162 USOC and IOC officials argued that 
Carter administration was overreacting to the Soviet invasion. Ultimately, Kane acquiesced to 
the boycott because he feared that the USOC would lose its tax status and governmental funding, 
which had amounted to $10 million since 1978.163 On April 22, 1980, the USOC voted 1604 to 
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797 to boycott the Moscow Olympics.164 When Kane made the announcement that the United 
States would not be participating in the 1980 Summer Olympics to the IOC, he cited President 
Carter’s argument that participating would endanger national security. Robert Kane believed that 
if the USOC sent a delegation to the Olympics, it would be unwisely challenging the president 
on foreign-policy.165 Thus, the USOC accepted and cooperated with the government’s decision. 
Public Opinion and the Media 
 The Carter administration paid close attention to public opinion. Initially, the public 
supported the boycott, and the media covered it favorably. Knowing the importance of public 
opinion to President Carter, Brzezinski pointed to supportive news articles as reaffirmation of the 
decision to boycott.166 A Gallup Poll taken at the time to measure the level of public support of 
the boycott found that 71 percent of those surveyed supported the boycott; whereas 17 percent 
were opposed to the measure.167 Two months later, Gallup polling revealed that the percentage of 
Americans supporting the boycott had dropped to 61 percent. An ABC-Louis Harris survey 
found 55 percent of the respondents supported the boycott with 39 percent opposing it. The 
remaining 6 percent were undecided.168 Other surveys found even more support for the boycott. 
For example, The Washington Star asked respondents “Should the United States boycott the 
Moscow Olympics?” Slightly over 85 percent responded yes, and 14 percent responded no.169 
Likewise, the Boston Herald Leader received similar responses, with 85 percent supportive.170  
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Public opposition to the boycott consisted of athletes and corporations who would have 
profited from the Olympics. President Carter reminded American athletes that if they attempted 
to compete in the Olympics, he would revoke their passports.171 NBC paid the Soviet Union $87 
million for the rights to televise the Moscow Olympics.172 In response to the Carter 
administration’s boycott announcement, the station began airing individual stories of the athletes 
opposed to the boycott. This was done even though NBC obtained insurance to recover 98 
percent of its financial commitment.173 Conversely, NBC committed to not airing the Olympics if 
American athletes were not competing.  
Some of the athletes felt that the government was wrongfully using them as pawns in an 
international political game; others supported the boycott. For example, pentathlon athlete Linda 
Cornelius Waltman saw the 1980 Moscow Olympics as her only opportunity to compete at a 
high level. “For me, that was the one chance I had…That is something you shouldn’t take away 
from an athlete who’s given so much and worked hard.”174 Conversely, Isaiah Thomas, at the 
time a sophomore basketball player at Indiana University, stated that he sympathized with the 
athletes whose careers would be tarnished by not participating in the Olympics, but understood 
the move. “It was a disappointment. At that time, it was made clear to us by the president of the 
stance he was taking, and the country was taking. We wanted to do what was right by our 
country, so we understood and we all followed through.”175 Some disgruntled athletes sued the 
USOC for voting to boycott the Olympics, but the case was dismissed.176 Public support of the 
boycott began to shift after the U.S. hockey team unexpectedly defeated the Soviet Union during 
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the Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York. After this win a Gallup Poll showed that 63 
percent of respondents supported attending the Moscow Olympics if the Soviet Union withdrew 
from Afghanistan before the Games.177 Opposition to the boycott was minor and came after the 
decision had been made.  
Congress 
 As an extension of public opinion, both the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives supported the boycott. After the Vietnam War, members of Congress promoted a 
more active congressional role in foreign-policy decisions. Consequently, the Carter 
administration often turned to Congress for support and consultation.178 During the Carter 
administration, Congress stepped up its involvement in Soviet affairs, including the decision to 
boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. Congress, in concurrence with the Carter 
administration, chose to postpone the ratification of SALT II after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and worked with President Carter to implement other sanctions against the Soviet 
Union.179 Congress introduced more than a dozen resolutions in support of the Olympic boycott. 
Senator David Pryor (D-AK) submitted a resolution to boycott the Olympics in Moscow, which 
his colleagues overwhelmingly supported.180 Members of both the House of Representatives and 
Congress broadly supported the boycott.181 In coverage Carter’s State of the Union Address, the 
media recorded a longstanding applause on the part of both branches of the Congress when 
Carter mentioned the boycott.182 Indeed, support for the boycott was far-reaching.  
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The only notable opposition in the Senate came from Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), 
who argued that participating in the Games was politically important. Goldwater saw the attempt 
to boycott the Olympics as poor foreign-policy and believed the boycott would politicize a 
nominally apolitical institution.183 Like many in opposition to the Olympic boycott, Goldwater 
cited Jesse Owen’s defeat of Nazi Germany’s track star in the 1936 Berlin Olympics as evidence 
that participation rather than a boycott was the most efficient political tool.184 Although Congress 
overwhelmingly supported the boycott, Congressional testimonies revealed some 
inconsistencies. For example, during the early stages of the boycott, President Carter considered 
the possibility of holding the Olympics in another location or hosting an alternative to the 
Games. When Congress began to inquire about the alternatives, problems with the alternative 
competition effort became apparent.185  Ultimately, Congress generally supported Carter in 
support of a full boycott. 
The International Community 
 International response to the United States decision to boycott the Olympics was mixed. 
In fact, most countries in the North Atlantic Trading Organization (NATO), official U.S. allies, 
chose not to boycott the Moscow Olympics for varying reasons. Margaret Thatcher of the United 
Kingdom supported the boycott because she did not want the Soviet Union to use the Games for 
propaganda.186 However, the United Kingdom’s Olympic federation voted to send a delegation 
to the Olympics and domestic opinion was opposed to the boycott, so the United Kingdom 
participated in the Games. Australia also supported the boycott, but later sent athletes.187 After 
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some cajoling from both Carter and domestic opinion, West Germany supported the boycott and 
chose not to send a delegation to the Olympics.188 The Netherlands both withdrew funding from 
its Olympic athletes and refused to send a delegation to the Olympics.189  
U.S. NATO Allies and Boycott Decision 
Country Boycott? 
Belgium No 
Canada Yes 
Denmark No 
France No 
Iceland No 
Italy No 
Luxembourg No 
The Netherlands Yes 
Norway Yes 
Portugal No 
The United Kingdom No 
Greece No 
Turkey Yes 
West Germany Yes 
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Other allies, such as France, opposed to the boycott. Carter believed that the Olympic 
boycott would be successful since 140 nations participated in the United Nations condemnation 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, these sentiments did not transpire to boycotting 
the Moscow Olympics. Few nations responded to the White House invitation to hold an 
alternative Olympics.190 Without the support of other countries and international federations, the 
Carter administration’s efforts to host an alternative Olympics failed. Unlike the American 
public, the international community showed demonstrably less support for the boycott. 
WHY BOYCOTT? 
 Although the decision to boycott was nominally up to the USOC, President Carter was 
the primary actor in deciding to boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. He unilaterally 
announced the boycott during a Meet the Press Interview, in which he also warned Olympic 
athletes not to try to attend on their own, and repeatedly reaffirmed the boycotting effort. Since 
Carter made the decision, why did he decide to utilize a sporting boycott as a tool of foreign-
policy?  
Sporting boycotts are an extension of sanctions, and governmental officials usually 
employ sanctions when other efforts have failed.  Although sanctions usually are not effective, 
states still implement then as a symbolic measure, and such was the case with President Carter 
and the 1980 Moscow Olympics. President Carter knew that military confrontation with the 
Soviet Union was not an option. The United States military was not prepared for confrontation, 
and the threat of a nuclear war further undermined such an approach. Thus, the administration’s 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remained limited to political and economic 
actions, although economic options were limited since the two countries conducted very little 
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trade with one another. The Carter administration had already implemented numerous sanctions 
before President Carter’s Meet the Press interview. President Carter believed that these actions—
especially the grain embargo—would force the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, 
evincing a fundamental misunderstanding of the Soviet Union.191 The grain embargo failed to 
achieve its intended goal, so President Carter sought more punitive options. Boycotting the 
Moscow Olympics was low cost, low risk, and high profile, but largely ineffective in coercing 
the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.  
The Carter administration understood the importance of the Olympics to the Soviet 
Union, stemming from the importance of honor in the Soviet culture. Honor for the Soviets 
encompasses the ability to defend one’s home and avenge violations and is often associated with 
nationalism.192 Historically, honor has been an integral part of Soviet society. Rooted in Eastern 
Christianity, honor includes the ideal of a strong state with the ability to protect its subjects from 
internal and external threats. During the Cold War, Soviet propaganda focused on honor, which 
came to be presented as defending the socialist ideology in conjunction with power and 
geopolitics.193   
Moreover, for the Soviet Union, the Olympics symbolized an international recognition of 
the legitimacy of the Soviet government.  Moscow had submitted numerous bids to host the 
Olympics, and the 1980 Summer Olympics was the first time the bid was accepted.194 Soviet 
press covered the progression of the Olympic games during the upcoming months. Although 
President Carter’s boycott was more symbolic than punitive, the Soviet deeply felt the impact on 
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their honor and self-confidence. President Carter clearly understood that the boycott posed a 
serious public challenge to Soviet prestige.   
The boycott also stood for action. Often political leaders implement sanctions when no 
other option is available to them. From this perspective, imposing sanctions are better than doing 
nothing. Furthermore, sanctions send citizens a message of support, express concern, and relay 
signals to the target state. Carter expressed such sentiments multiple times throughout the 
boycott effort in public speeches, interviews, and in his writing. Carter argued that the U.S. could 
not appear complacent in the face of Soviet aggression; attending the Olympics would be 
conducting “business as usual.”195   
Individuals can become bound to an unfavorable course of action by escalating their 
commitment to an action. President Carter publicly committed to the boycott on Meet the Press. 
After publicly announcing the one-month deadline on national television, Carter could not retract 
the boycott because it would have questioned his credibility. President Carter cared deeply about 
his credibility and his popularity among voters, particularly given the looming reelection 
campaign. When public opinion turned against the boycott after the Winter Olympics, Carter 
reaffirmed his intentions to boycott. Even if Carter later realized that implementing the boycott 
could not achieve his intended goals, he was bound to continue the boycott because he had 
publicly committed to the action.   
Beyond President Carter, other individuals in the administration also contributed to the 
decision to boycott. Brzezinski saw the Soviet Union as an adversary and viewed the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan as a threat to U.S. national security. Given the organization of Carter’s 
advisory system, Brzezinski, who chaired the SCC, was able to impart his beliefs to President 
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Carter multiple times during the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Cyrus Vance, 
who exercised considerably less influence than Brzezinski, also helped to shape the boycott 
policy.  
Carter was cognizant of the public’s and Congress’s opinion during this time, and the 
public initially supported the move to boycott the Moscow Olympics. Surveys conducted during 
the initial stages of the boycott showed that public opinion favored the boycott. Media coverage 
of the boycott also favored the boycott. Both the Senate and House of Representatives supported 
the boycott. Even those who did not initially support the boycott—the State Department, the 
United States Olympic Committee, and the International Olympic Committee—eventually 
acquiesced to boycott the Moscow Olympics. Allies and other countries’ governmental officials 
supported the boycott, albeit they did not always have the authority to ensure that its delegation 
participated in the boycott. With public opinion, the media, and Congress supporting the boycott, 
Carter had the domestic support to follow through with the decision.  
President Carter and others within his administration knew that boycotting the Moscow 
Olympics would not force the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. President Carter and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski both argued that the purpose of the boycott was to make the Soviet-Afghan 
War as symbolically costly as possible for the Soviet Union. The Olympic boycott was aimed 
against the Soviet Union’s prestige. Carter wanted to convey to the Soviet Union that the United 
States did not approve of the invasion. Carter was aware that the Soviet Union would use the 
Games for propaganda and had made significant investments to building facilities for the Games 
and would ultimately use them to propagandize about Soviet superiority and American 
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weakness.196 President Carter wanted to inflict the most harm possible upon the Soviet Union 
without the risk of direct military conflict. 
THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS BOYCOTT: IN ACTION AND THE AFTERMATH 
 Despite the U.S. absence from the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, the Games were 
successful, especially for the Soviet Union. The Opening Ceremony of the 1980 Summer 
Olympics in Moscow was exceptional. The Soviet Union exuded national pride through the 
performances by dancers, musicians, and flags carriers.197 Most notably, a Soviet basketball 
player climbed a human tower created by Soviet citizens in order to light the Olympic flame.198 
The stadium was at full capacity, and the Soviet Union earned a sizeable profit from hosting the 
Games. Without participation from United States and Germany, the Soviet Union won 195 
medals, 80 of which were gold.199 Looking beyond the performance of the Soviet Union, 36 
world records were set.200 Given Soviet performance and the number of world records sets at the 
Games, the Moscow Olympics were successful for the Soviet Union despite the Carter 
administration’s effort to foil the event as punishment for the invasion of Afghanistan. 
Scholars dispute the question of whether the Olympic boycott succeeded. In total, 80 
countries attended the Moscow Olympics, compared to 92 countries participating in the 1976 
Montreal Summer Olympics.201 Eighty countries participated in those Olympics.202 In addition, 
other delegations competed independently, without a country affiliation. Records also show that 
65 nations did not attend the Olympics. Not all nations, however, that did not attend did so in 
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protest. Some nations simply lacked the resources to send athletes.203 Indeed, most of the 
countries that chose to boycott were developing countries, whereas the Olympic movement was 
more important to developed countries.204 These countries most likely were not coerced into 
boycotting the Olympics, but wanted to gain favor with the U.S. According to Brzezinski, the 
boycott was successful since the United States, China, Japan, and West Germany boycotted the 
Moscow Olympics.205 However, China and Japan may have been important in world politics, but 
not sports. Furthermore, China, threatened by the Soviet military presence in a bordering 
country, boycotted not in response to U.S. pressure but for its own reason. According to U.S. 
State Department’s records, all 65 absent nations were counted as boycotting states.206 The State 
Department also alleged that the 65 nations that did not attend the Moscow Olympics won 71 
percent of the medals in the last Summer Olympics in Montreal.207 According to Nicholas 
Sarantakes’ assessment, the nations that attended the Moscow Olympics made up 70 percent of 
the medals won at the 1976 Montreal Olympics.208 Clearly, scholars do not agree regarding the 
overall effectiveness of the boycott. However, it must be noted that with the absence of athletes 
from West Germany and the United States, the competition of the Moscow Olympics could not 
be deemed as elite since a significant number of athletes were missing.  
The Carter administration was not successful in forcing the Soviet Union out of 
Afghanistan, but that was not the primary goal of the Olympic boycott. Soviet citizens exposed 
to Western media were aware that the boycott was in response to international disapproval of 
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their government.209 Brezhnev espoused that the boycott was an attempt to reignite Cold War 
competition: “Not a day goes by when Washington has not tried to revive the spirit of the ‘Cold 
War,’ to heat up militaristic passions. Any grounds are used for this, real or imagined. One 
example of this is Afghanistan.”210 To General Secretary Brezhnev, the Carter administration 
showed disrespect for important interstate exchanges by boycotting the Olympics.211 In the 
Soviet press, journalists argued that if the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had not occurred, then 
the Carter administration would have found another reason to boycott the Moscow Olympics. 
The Soviet Union was cognizant of the absences of so many countries from the Olympics, 
including the United States. Evincing the negative sentiments associated with the 1980 Moscow 
Olympics, Soviet press stated that it was regrettable that the U.S. did not attend the Olympics, 
but despite the Carter administration’s attempt to destroy the Olympics, the Soviet Union 
prevailed.212 In 1984, the Soviet Union and other communist bloc countries did not attend the 
Los Angeles Olympics.213 Soviet officials claimed that Reagan administration would not provide 
necessary security for Soviet athletes. However, many viewed the Soviet’s absence as simply a 
pay-back from the U.S. 1980 boycott.  
Although scholars agree that the Carter administration’s Olympic boycott did not force 
the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan, some argue that the boycott succeeded symbolically. 
President Carter conveyed clearly to the world U.S. disapproval of Soviet aggression against 
Afghanistan. The Carter administration’s boycott punished and embarrassed the Soviet Union on 
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a widely observed global stage. Moreover, given that more than 60 countries refused to attend 
the Moscow Olympics, its success was enhanced. In addition, the absence of American and 
German athletes undermined the value of the medals the Soviets claimed at the Games. The 
Soviet Union flaunted the fact that it had dominated the Moscow Olympics, but its victories were 
not viewed as fully legitimate. Four years later the Soviets retaliated by inflicting similar 
embarrassment on the U.S. by refusing to attend the Los Angeles Olympics. Thus, the imposition 
of a sporting boycott as a foreign-policy tool worked because the boycott did what it was 
intended to do—embarrass the Soviet Union. 
CONCLUSION 
President Carter boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics to punish the Soviet Union for 
invading Afghanistan. The leaders in his administration knew that utilizing the sporting boycott 
as a foreign-policy tool would not force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. However, they still 
chose to implement the Olympic boycott because it would challenge the Soviet Union’s prestige 
in a very public setting.  
Key figures in the Carter administration, including President Carter, National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, framed the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan as a threat to the United States. Other actors such as Vice President Walter 
Mondale, White House Special Counsel Lloyd Cutler, the United States Olympic Committee and 
the International Olympic Committee, Congress, public opinion, the media, and the international 
community influenced the decision to boycott and contributed to its implementation. The Carter 
administration chose to enact a sporting boycott because past economic and diplomatic sanctions 
failed as a means of inflicting harm on Moscow. Moreover, it wanted to embarrass and diminish 
the Soviet Union, which was hosting the Olympic Games at the time. By refusing to attend and 
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convincing other countries to stay home, the U.S. effectively undermined the quality of the 
Moscow Games and undermined the legitimacy and value of Soviet Olympic victories.  
 Sports and politics are often deeply intertwined. This connection is especially apparent 
during international sporting competitions such as the Olympics. The increasingly overt 
connection between sports and politics has prompted some scholars to deem the use of 
diplomacy or other foreign-policy tools in influencing sporting competitions as sports diplomacy. 
Sports diplomacy can be utilized to improve or strengthen friendly relations or to inflict 
punishment, shame, or embarrassment. In the case of the 1980 Olympic boycott, President 
Carter’s use of sports diplomacy sought to punish and embarrass the Soviet Union on a very 
global stage. 
 Historically, scholars such as Robert Pape, Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, and Detlef Sprinz 
have argued that sanctions are not effective in coercing a state to alter its behavior. Their theory 
certainly holds true in this case. But the goal of the Carter administration reached beyond forcing 
Soviet withdrawal. This boycott provides an example of a country using soft power as a 
mechanism for exposing, reprimanding, and punishing a recalcitrant regime. This outcome, 
while difficult to measure, fulfilled its objective. Given the circumstances and the constraints on 
available tools, the Carter administration chose the right tool and wielded it effectively.  
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